

**SECURITY CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS IN AFRICA, NIGERIA IN PERSPECTIVE: A STYLIZED FACTS APPROACH**

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**Abstract**

This study examined the effect of security challenges on FDI in Africa, Nigeria in perspective. Specifically the study traced among others the effect of terrorism, political violence, and religious tension on FDI inflows in Nigeria using tables, charts and trends techniques to examine the FDI inflows in African countries bedeviled with security challenges to justify the effect of these variables on FDI inflows as identified in literature as factors that determine the inflows of FDI to resource-rich country. The stylized facts, as the empirical regularities in search of theoretical and causal explanations of these variables discovered that security challenges proxied by terrorism, political violence, and religious tension affect FDI inflow to Nigeria. In Nigeria and many other African countries, challenges like petty crimes, kidnapping, armed robberies, ethnic/religious killings, ritualism, Xenophobia, civil war armed insurgency such as: Niger Delta problem, Boko Haram massacres in the North-east, Fulani Herdsmen mass killing everywhere with cases of raping and the agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) for the Sovereign State of Biafra and banditry in the North-west are the new waves. Thus, this study among other things, recommends the intensification of effort in the war against insecurity issues in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, Political Violence, Religion Tension, Foreign Direct Investment, Stylized Facts.

JEL Classification: F21, F23, F52, H5

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**Introduction**

Most developing countries inclusive of Nigeria are bedeviled with myriad development challenges such as dualistic economy, narrow economic base, low productivity, low savings, low investment and so on. Chenery and Strout (1966) stated that capital inflows such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) help bridge the saving and investment gap due to its multiplicity effects on the economy. FDI is presumed to have a positive impact on employment, technological progress, productivity and economic growth. It plays the critical roles of filling foreign exchange, investment, and tax revenue gaps in developing countries (Anyanwu, 2011).

Natural resources, cheap labor, and size of GDP make developing countries an attractive market for resource-seeking and market-seeking FDI. Hence, these factors have made Africa a potential destination for

FDI inflows. These factors are the initial prerequisite for FDI to naturally flow into a country. It is also important to mention here that beside these, theoretical and empirical evidence holds that other factors affect location and choice of investment by foreign investors in resource-rich developing countries (Asiedu, 2002 and 2006). There may be large number of these factors, but this study focused on security challenge as identified in conventional literature.

The empirical evaluation of the effect of political risk on foreign direct investment inflows in developed and developing economies were carried out using different methodologies and data set by various authors such as: Xingwan and Kyeonighi (2015), Nasreen and Anwar (2014), Seyedaskhan and Mahya (2014), and Krishna (2012), they all acknowledged in

their separate studies that political risk are important considerations for foreign investors even in industrialized markets when we control for other economic factors; political risk is a significant determinant of FDI inflows in both industrialized and developing nations; not all political risk components affect the inflows of FDI in the same fashion in industrialized and developing countries; the findings show that host economy with good democratic accountability and a good investment profile can attract significantly more FDI inflows in both industrialized and developing countries

Witte *at-el.* (2017), study of the effect of political violence on Greenfield FDI in a sample of 90 developing countries. The study found that political conflict is negatively related to total and non-resource-related Greenfield FDI. The least geographically diversified firms in the non-resource sectors are found to be most affected by conflict. Resource-related FDI was however found to be unaffected by political violence. This was attributed to the high profitability of the resource sectors, and geographic constraints on location choice, contrary to this finding, Li (2006), investigated the effect of political violence on FDI inflows in a sample of 129 countries and empirical evidence indicated that political violence adversely affects inflow of FDI to countries included in the sample.

From country-specific study for Pakistan in literature on terrorism vis-à-vis foreign direct investment inflows by Alam and Mingque (2018), and Alam *at-el.* (2017), using separate methodologies their study revealed that, terrorism negatively and significantly impact FDI inflows and terrorism in the country in the short run and in the long run hamper the inflows. In addition, Haider and Anwar (2014), Zulfiqar *et al.* (2014), and Ullah and Rahman (2014), in their separate studies for Pakistan also found out that there is an inverse relationship between terrorism and FDI inflows. Increase in the number of

terrorist attacks was found to be associated with decrease in FDI that flowed into the country. However, a disaggregated analysis showed that terrorism has dissimilar effect on FDI inflows to various sectors. While the effect is negative and significant in communications, construction, chemicals, personal services and financial business sectors, its effect in oil and gas and trade, power, petroleum refining and trade sectors are also negative but statistically not significant. This could be attributed to high returns on investment from these sectors and in most cases foreign investors behaved as risk lover. This implies that terrorism reduces investors' confidence in an economy because of insecurity it generates. The main objective of this study is to identify the effects of security challenge on FDI inflows in Nigeria through a stylized facts approach to compliment empirical literature. Thus, this study sheds light on FDI inflows and it looks at the trends of the inflows order to establish the fundamental facts of the problem that has led to low and erratic FDI inflows to Nigeria. This analysis has helped to identify the specific determinants of FDI inflows peculiar to Nigeria. Tables, charts and trends were employed to justify this variable (security challenges) as identified in literature as factors that determine the inflows of FDI to Nigeria.

The rest of this research is organized into four sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 covers literature review while Section 3 focuses on security challenges and FDI inflows in Africa, then Section 4 contains results and summary of findings and Section 5 is the conclusion and recommendations.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1 Theoretical Review

The Eclectic Theory is concerned about the sharp rise in worldwide foreign direct investment during the 1980s and 1990s which has resulted in an equally rapid increase in studies on the drivers of FDI. These studies have presented a variety of

theoretical models and frameworks which attempt to explain FDI and the location decisions of Multinational Corporations. Multinational Corporations are corporations that have the physical presence in more than two countries of the world. The widely known and cited framework in this regard was the OLI-framework as developed by (Dunning, 1980). In this framework, Multinational Corporations engage in foreign direct investment based on three advantages: Ownership advantages, Location advantages, and Internalization advantages (OLI). Location advantages relate to the country-specific advantages that the firm gains when investing abroad. Internalization advantages relate to the production kind of activities undertaken by the firm itself rather than licensing them to another party. Ownership advantages may include firm's superiority over its competitors in terms of marketing practices or on the technological front (Alam & Shah, 2013)

Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz (2012), further explained that Multinational corporations operating in a foreign country market has many costs and these "costs" include failure of knowledge about local market conditions, cultural, legal and many other costs. Thus, foreign firms should have some advantages that can offset these costs. Ownership advantage is a firm-specific advantage as earlier stated that gives power to firms over their competitors. Among other things are: advantage in technology, in management techniques, easy access to finance, economies of scale and capacity to coordinate activities. Location advantages are country-specific advantages.

For foreign investors to fully reap the benefit of firm-specific advantages, they usually consider the location advantages of the host country. This includes accessibility and low cost of the natural resource, cost of distance, adequate infrastructure, political atmosphere, macroeconomic conditions and financial position of the host country which are components of country risk. Consequently, the location advantage of the host country is one essential factor that

determines the foreign investors' decision. Internalization is multinational Corporations' ability to internalize some activities to protect their exclusive right to tangible and intangible assets and defend their competitive advantage from rival firms. All these three conditions must be met before transnational companies open a subsidiary in a foreign country (Oluchukwu, 2013).

## 2.2 Empirical Review

Iyaji (2021), investigate effect of insurgency, political risk on foreign direct inflows in Nigeria: a sectoral analysis. The study found that insurgency proxied by terrorism and corruption affect FDI inflow to the economy. FDI was adversely affected by terrorism while corruption exhibited a negative and significant effect on FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector and corruption also exerted positive and significant effect on FDI inflows to the oil and gas sector but statistically not significant on other sectors for this study

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The effect of terrorism on FDI was found to be larger than its effect on tourism (Maja, Daniel, & Marina, 2019). In different study by Radić (2018), using dynamic panel data model, it was found that no significant effect of terrorism on FDI in tourism in the long and short-run. The study however found that international tourists arrival and ease of doing business positively and significantly affect inflow of FDI in the tourism sector. The study by Bezić *at-et.* (2016), employed similar dynamic panel data model revealed that that terrorist activities adversely affected inflow of FDI to the country. This implies that terrorism reduces investors' confidence in an economy because of insecurity generated. Similarly, Macroeconomic factors namely GDP per capita (a measure of market size) and capital account openness were found to positively and significantly affect FDI inflows. Thus, expansion of market size, and liberalisation of capital accounts enhance the attractiveness of a country to FDI inflows.

In different geographical economy of country-specific studies in Sub-Saharan African countries, conducted for Kenya by

Kinyanjui (2014), the study discovered that terrorism negatively affected FDI inflows in the country. In other words, it acts as a deterrent to the flow of FDI into the country and Beatrice (2015), in a similar manner investigated Boko-Haram insurgency (terrorism) and its impact on the development of Nigeria as a nation and found that the Boko-Haram insurgency has posed serious limitations on development process of Nigeria due to destruction of lives and properties, destruction of schools which have led to the closure of so many schools in the North-East geopolitical zone, disruption of businesses, reduction in government revenue, fear of foreign investors to live and do business in Nigeria, political instability, among others.

### 3. Security Challenges and FDI Inflows in Africa

#### 3.1 Security challenges in Nigeria

Nigeria is the 3<sup>rd</sup> most terrorised country in the world, behind Iraq and Afghanistan, and the most terrorised country in Africa (Global Terrorism Index, 2018). These are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.

**Table 1 Top 10 Most Terrorised Countries in the World**

Rank	Country
1	Iraq
2	Afghanistan
<b>3</b>	<b>Nigeria</b>
4	Syria
5	Pakistan
6	Somalia
7	India
8	Yemen
9	Egypt
10	Philippines

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2018

**Table 2.2. Top Eight Most Terrorised Countries in Africa**

Rank	Country
1	Nigeria
2	Somalia
3	Egypt
4	Democratic Republic of Congo
5	Libya
6	South Sudan
7	Central Africa Republic
8	Cameroon

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2018

According to Financial Nigeria (2018, paragraph 3), Boko Haram Jihadist and armed Fulani Herdsmen accounted for 63% of terror attacks and 88% of terror related deaths in 2017. The Boko Haram group had been the deadliest terrorist group in the country. The heinous activities of these groups and other groups such as the militant groups may have contributed to the low volume of FDI that flows into the country. Terrorism in Nigeria generally followed an upward between 2008 and 2017 as reflected in her terrorism index in spite of her huge and rising military expenditure. The trend in the terrorism index is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Trends in Nigeria's Terrorism Index (2008-2017).

Source: IEP GTI 2018.

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, 2019) classified Nigeria among the top twenty positive peace-deficit countries. The positive peace-deficit countries are countries which had weak institutions and social structures and were vulnerable to deterioration in peace. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI) report recently

published by the IEP (2019), Nigeria ranks 148 on the index (out of 163 countries with an index score of 2.898, making it one of the least peaceful countries in the world, one of the top 5 least peaceful countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the top least peaceful country in West Africa. These are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3.




Figure 2 Top Five Least Peaceful Countries in SSA  
Source: IEP GPI 2019.




Figure 3 Top Five Least Peaceful Countries in West Africa  
Source: IEP GPI 2019.

### 3.2 Security Challenge and FDI Inflows in Other African Countries

On an annual average basis, Nigeria share of FDI inflows to Africa is low compared to Angola, Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa at different periods. Why does Nigeria not attract much FDI inflows in the continent of Africa despite her huge economic potential?

The answer to this question is important in economics, business, politics, and academia on the Continent and hence calls for further analysis of the region FDI inflows to unearth the factors behind this poor performance despite her huge potential to attract FDI much more than any other country in Africa.


To achieve this, there is a need for country-specific analysis to know the determinants of FDI inflows that are peculiar to each country in Africa before a general conclusion about the factors that determine FDI inflows to Nigeria can be drawn for this study.

Since the focus of this study is on Nigeria, this stylized fact dwell much on African regions and specifically on West Africa region where Nigeria is geographically located. On an annual basis, West Africa regional share of FDI inflows to Africa was 54.6 percent in 1990; dropped to 38.9 percent in 1993, and by 1994 it rose to 45.7.

In the same year North Africa region received FDI inflows of 40.6 percent, 44.3 percent, and 37.3 percent of the total inflows of FDI to Africa, while that of Southern region during the same year stood at zero percent, 10.3 percent, and 14.4 percent respectively consequent upon

the Angola’s Civil War that lasted till 2001. Central Africa region had negative record in those years majorly due to war in Burundi and Rwanda and very low receipt of FDI inflows to East Africa region.

FDI inflows to Africa vary across sub-regions. As Figure 4 below illustrates, West Africa and Southern Africa dominated the scene between 2005 and 2016 but from 2006 to 2007, North Africa was the dominant sub-region. In 2009, North Africa and Southern Africa sub-regions experienced declines although while other sub-regions recorded marginal growth of FDI inflow. A major concern regarding FDI inflows to the Continent is that the overwhelming majority of these inflows went into natural resources exploitation. Therefore, only the resource-rich countries were largely advantageous in attracting FDI inflows and the region witnessed little development.



**Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2018**

Southern Africa region saw a sporadic of FDI inflows from US\$4 billion in 2000 to US\$11 billion in 2001 and move to the height of US\$33 billion in 2013, but the inflows to the region began to decline steadily to US\$21 billion in 2016 due to xenophobia in South Africa; FDI inflows to South Africa country fell dramatically; this

has affected the total inflows to the region. The breakdown of individual country revealed that South Africa and Angola are the two major recipients of FDI inflows to Southern region. The inflows to North Africa took upward trend from 2003 as estimated at US\$5 billion and moved to an average of US\$21 billion between 2006 and

2009 but slightly dropped to US\$7 billion in 2011 and then move on an average of US\$13 billion between 2012 and 2016 (see UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics, 2018).


The sharp fall from US\$15 billion in 2010 to US\$7 billion in 2011 in North Africa region was principally due to the insurgence activities in Libya and Egypt as foreign investors were averse emerging risk emanating from insecurity. But the trend was reversed by the following year as Egypt saw a rebound of investment from US\$4.6 billion in 2014 to an estimated US\$6.9 billion in 2015.

West Africa experienced a steady upward trend from 2002 with estimated FDI inflows of US\$3 billion to the height of US\$19 billion in 2011 and declined steadily to US\$11 billion in 2016 as Nigeria was hit hard by intense insurgence activities in the North-East, kidnapping, terrorism, pervasive grand corruption, and the drop in

oil prices. From this analysis it was discovered that, there are three major Africa sub-regions such as Southern, North and West Africa regions that largely dominated the inflows of FDI to Africa, hence this study takes a critical look at these three regions and unravel the factors responsible for low and erratic FDI inflows to individual country under these regions.

### 3.3 Southern Africa Countries

Southern Africa region is the largest recipient of FDI inflows to Africa. In 2001 the region received 51.4 percent share of the total inflows to Africa and maintained an average of 40 percent within the period of 2001-2005. The region consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. From Figure 5 below, Angola has the substantial share of FDI inflows to this region, followed up by South Africa and Mozambique joined the trend of the flows in the last five years.



Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2018

The estimate of inflows of FDI to Angola in the last ten years has doubled the period of war. The estimated inflows in 2007 stood at US\$9 billion and rose to US\$16 billion in 2008. Between 20014 and 2016, the average inflows of FDI to Angola were US\$16 billion, while the inflow to South Africa is very erratic. The estimated inflows stood at

US\$9 billion in 2007 and US\$8 billion in 2008 respectively in South Africa. The inflows relapsed sharply to an average of US\$2 billion between 2015 and 2016 in South Africa; this is mostly due to xenophobia crisis during that period; which informed the foreign investors' decision on the choice of location and internalization of



their investment in South Africa. Hence, insurgence activities have been identified as the likely major factors that deter FDI inflows to this country over this period (see UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics, 2018).


### 3.4 North Africa Countries

North Africa region was the second largest recipient of FDI inflows to Africa between 2000 and 2005 (see UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics, 2018) the region became the largest recipient with an inflow of US\$22 billion in 2007 and US\$23 billion in 2008 which surpassed that of Southern Africa region. But the inflows deteriorated sharply to US\$8 billion in 2011 basically because of religious tensions, political violence and other forms of insurgence activities in Libya, Egypt, and South Sudan. There was a reversal of FDI inflows from Egypt with an estimated valued of US\$483 million in 2011. Libya FDI inflows of US\$2 billion in 2010 dropped to zero in 2011 because of the war. The Chinese investors evacuated all their expatriates from Libya within that period and closed up all their companies. But the inflows marginally rose from zero to US\$1.4 billion in 2012 after the president was reported killed. This rise was likely due

to reopening of the companies and the returned of the Chinese expatriates to Libya but the inflows went down as low as US\$50 million in 2014.

In South Sudan, there was a reversal of US\$793 million in 2013 and many foreign investors are moving out of that country mostly due to the prolonged war in that country. Morocco received an annual average of US\$2 million inflows of FDI for the period of 2005-2010 and US\$3 for the period of 2011-2016. The country is the second largest recipient after Egypt in the last six years. The inflows of FDI to other countries in this region were relatively low, but as the insurgency subsided in Egypt, the inflows rose to US\$6 billion in 2012 and went as high as US\$8 billion in 2016.

From the overview of FDI inflows to Southern and North Africa countries, it has been unveiled that Angola is the leading countries in terms of the inflows in the last decade. The North Africa region is made up of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia. The general picture is depicted in figure 13 below.



Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2018


### **3.5 West Africa Countries**

This region is the third largest recipient of FDI inflows to Africa between 2000 and 2010 and it became the second largest recipient of the inflows at an estimate of US\$19 billion in 2011 and US\$17 billion in 2012, the inflows slightly slide down to US\$14 billion in 2013 and equate FDI inflows to North Africa at US\$12 billion in 2014. It relapsed to US\$10 billion in 2015 and US\$11 billion in 2016, just a little lower than that of North Africa and twice lower than that of Southern Africa. The region comprises of Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

Nigeria is the largest recipient of FDI inflows to West Africa region followed by Ghana. Nigeria FDI inflows topped other countries in the region since the 1990s. The estimated inflows as at 1994 were US\$2.3 billion and fell gradually to an average of US\$1.4 billion between 1995 and 2001, at this period Ghana was doing an average of US\$80 million. But the tide turned when Nigeria embraced democracy in May 1999 as empirical literature confirmed that

democracy serves as an attraction to foreign investors.

The average FDI inflows in Nigeria was US\$2.1 billion between 2003 and 2004 and in 2004 it rose to US\$5 billion while Ghana estimated inflows in that year was US\$ 145 million. The inflow to Nigeria rose to US\$8.4 billion on average between 2008 and 2009 and fell to US\$3 billion in 2009. FDI inflows to Ghana has been upward trend and steady since then, it catches up and surpassed the inflows to Nigeria with an estimate of US\$3.2 billion in 2015 while Nigeria was at her peak of US\$9 billion in 2011 and steadily deteriorated to US\$ 3.1 billion in 2015 and now US\$4.4 billion in 2016. This may have been due to insurgency in the North-East and other political peril prevailing in the country (see UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics, 2018). Figure 6 revealed that only Nigeria and Ghana in Sub-Saharan Africa countries enjoy the inflows and the rest countries are less attractive to foreign direct investors as the inflows are very low. Ghana is becoming more attractive than Nigeria because in Nigeria insurgency, resource and power control agitations, grand corruption and epileptic power supply are prevalent.



**Figure 6. FDI inflows to West Africa Countries**  
**Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2018**

**4. Results and Summary of Findings**

From the foregoing analysis of the stylized facts of FDI inflows cross the developing economies specifically, about Africa countries is that FDI flows naturally to countries with natural resources and low political, religion and ethnic perils. Foreign investors are emerging risk-averse since September 11; attack on World Trade Centre in York.

In Africa Angola has been identified as the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the last seventeen years. Why is Angola the major recipient of FDI inflows? What are the factors influencing FDI inflows to that country? Is there any similarity between Angola and Nigeria?

On an annual average basis, the share of Africa FDI inflows to Nigeria was 22.5 percent in the period 1990-1999 and the country became the largest recipient

followed by South Africa and Egypt with 12.8 and 12.1 percent respectively while Angola and Morocco had a share of 8.6 and 8.4 percent respectively of the total inflows; but the reverse was the case between 2000-2009 when Angola took the lead with 21.9 percent followed by Egypt with 12.6 percent, Nigeria 10.9 and South Africa 10.8 during that period.


Angola’s percentage share of the total FDI inflows to Africa in the period of 2005-2010 is 19.3 percent and this made the country the largest recipient of FDI inflows in Africa and Egypt from the North Africa region had 14.5 percent share of the inflows during the same period. In the same vain Nigeria is the third largest recipient with 11.4 percentage share of the total inflows of FDI to Africa; followed by South Africa with 9.9 percent share and Libya share of the total inflows which stood at 4.5 percent and Morocco with 3.8 percent while Ghana is the last on

the list within the same period with 2.4 percentage share of the inflows.

But the annual average of the last seven years (2010-2016) revealed that Angola had received whopping FDI inflows of 21.7 percent, while others like Nigeria had 8.5 percent, Egypt 7.6 percent, South Africa 6.5 percent, Ghana 4.7 percent and Morocco 4.1 percent. Libya in this three specified periods had a share of -0.3, 3.7 and 1.1 percent.

The revelation from this period is that the overwhelming majority of these inflows go into natural resources exploitation such as oil and gas, and mining projects. This can be seen from the case of Ghana when the discovering of oil and full exploration

started the inflows became very visible. Nigeria has large deposit of oil and gas, other natural resources, and cheap labor than Ghana and Angola, but FDI inflows to these countries are relatively stable than that of Nigeria; this trend may be principally due to security challenge such as: political peril, ethnic war, religious disharmony, resource control agitation, quest for power-sharing that are prevalent in Nigeria. Ghana and Angola have enjoyed upward steady inflows of FDI in the last ten years. Therefore, the drive of foreign direct investors to invest in natural resource-rich countries in Africa may mostly depend on the level of national security, as this hampered the steady inflows of FDI to Nigeria.



**Figure 7. Top Seven Recipients Countries of FDI in Africa**  
**Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2018**

One fundamental fact about FDI inflows to Africa countries is that the security challenge is likely the factor that determines the inflows. For instance, in North Africa countries it was discovered that FDI inflows deteriorated in 2011 largely due to religious tensions, political crisis, war and other insurgence activities in Egypt, Libya and South Sudan. Moreover, the inflows of FDI to Morocco and Sudan have been upward

slow and steady; because there is relatively peaceful political atmosphere there.

In Southern Africa countries, Angola suffered a significant setback in attracting FDI inflows during the civil war. But the tide of the inflows turned when the resolution to return to the democratic system came in 1998 and the country saw a rebound of the inflows when the war finally

ended 2003. Between the period of 2014 and 2016, there was also a sharp fall in FDI inflows to South Africa largely due to Xenophobia that started within that period; whereas Mozambique experienced appreciable upward steady record of FDI inflows between the period of 2010 and 2016.

Ghana and Morocco received the lowest FDI inflows among the seven largest recipients of FDI in Africa at different periods. The flows to Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa have been very erratic and there is no clear-cut which of these countries is the second largest recipient of FDI inflows in the last ten years in Africa and none of these countries are free of all form of insurgence activities.

The amount of FDI that flows into Ghana and Angola has been more than that which flows to Nigeria in recent times in spite of the fact that Nigeria's economy is larger than that of Ghana and Angola in terms of market size, population, natural resource deposit, etc. However, security challenge has assumed alarming rate in the country this may largely tend to deter FDI inflows to the country.

Why then are FDI inflows to Angola far higher than that of Nigeria? The macroeconomic indicators that measure the size of the economy are favorable for both countries to attract FDI proportional to their potential. Nigerian macroeconomic indicators between 2011 and 2013 had shown that macroeconomic environment is favorable enough to attract much more of FDI inflows and in terms of natural resource deposit, Nigeria has more than Angola both in volume and varieties.

Most literature tend to study the effects of security challenge on FDI inflows to developing countries largely due to the fact that, industrialized countries are deemed to be politically stable and immune to radical political changes and violence, and, secondly, terrorism should affect the

investment decisions of foreign investors more when they consider investing in developing nations with high insurgence activities and low credibility. FDI and security challenge had shown that there is a strong negative relationship between them. This is in concomitant with the conventional literature.

### **5. Conclusion and Recommendations**

The amount of FDI that flows into Nigeria's economy has been quite low compared to the amount that flows into other emerging market economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Security challenge in some African countries has affected the FDI inflows in those countries such as war in Burundi and Rwanda, xenophobia in South Africa, war in Libya and political crisis in Egypt and insurgence activities in Nigeria; these are pointer to the fact that foreign investors are insecurity averse. From the trend analysis security challenge has been identified as a deterring factor to FDI inflows. The country is facing national security challenges in recent times; Terrorism, political violence, and religion crisis. These have contributed to making the country one of the least peaceful and most terrorized countries in the world. These factors, together with some macroeconomic factors such as poor infrastructure high inflation and weak institutions may have tend to reduce her attractiveness to FDI inflows thereby deterring FDI inflows to the country.

Based on the stylized facts emanating from the study, the followings are recommended;

1. Efforts should be intensified by Nigerian government on the war against security challenge through a combination of diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance by working with foreign government partners to develop modern warfare technologies that will build the capabilities necessary to prevent, degrade, detect, and respond to security threats. This includes efforts to strengthen law enforcement and judicial

- capabilities, expand aviation and border security, deepen global information sharing, counter terrorist financing, improve crisis response, and counter violent extremism.
2. The elective positions in government at all levels should be made a single tenure and electronic voting should be introduced into the electoral process with adequate education and enlightenment campaign for the electorates by the electoral bodies. The monetary benefits of the elective positions should be made less attractive and the country also need to create an environment that enables strong and accountable civil society organizations that provide oversight of these offices. By so doing, political violence could be brought to the barest minimum in the country.
  3. Being a secular country, issues relating to religious tension in Nigeria may not be completely ruled out. However, efforts should be intensified by the government through the leaders of the various religious groups to stem the incessant tension and violence against other religious faith/groups in the country.
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**THE MARGINALIZATION OF INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES IN MODERN  
AFRICAN LITERATURE: A STUDY OF IBRAHIM SHEMA'S YARTSANA**

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**Abstract**

Even though few writers have used indigenous languages as a means of communication in writing novels, there is a scarcity of critical explorations in this area. Drawing on Ngugi Wa Thiong'o's *Decolonizing the Mind*, this paper analyzes Ibrahim SHEMA's award-winning novel, *Yartsana*. The paper argues that works written in indigenous languages not only give an adequate representation of the cultural context of the people but also can generate a larger audience and, thus, an effective communication tool. For instance, in the novel, Hausa language is used to capture the complexities of the cultural term 'auren dole' which can roughly be translated as forced marriage in English. Such complexities can only be captured perfectly through indigenous languages as opposed to foreign languages such as English, which often limit, truncate, and alter the meaning of such complexities. Thus, indigenous languages in literature need to be inculcated in academic conferences and the curriculum as well.

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**Introduction**

Although UNESCO declared 2020 and the year 2022-2032 as the decade of the indigenous languages, the African literary landscape is still overwhelmingly dominated by European languages, particularly English and French. Despite about 2000 languages spoken across Africa, the languages of the countries which colonized most of Africa are considered being the readily available choices to succeed as a writer. This systematic silencing of the indigenous languages in African literature is perhaps because of the marginal role and status it accorded literature in African languages in the academic ivory-towers of world literature and the colonial mentality that associates high prestige to the colonial languages. There is therefore an implicit assumption that literature in African languages cannot be categorized "worldly" or 'global' enough because, as David Damrosch observes, world literature is defined by their outreach or circulation beyond their culture of origin (4). The implication here is that all

those literary works which do not circulate beyond their culture of origin cannot be said to be world literature and, since Afrophone literature mostly due to lack of institutional support, rarely make it beyond their culture of origin. It is therefore imperative that African literary scholars should interrogate critically their complicity with colonial thought in the academy, paying particular attention to their unwitting contribution to the growth of the European languages in African literature at the expense of their indigenous African languages. The systematic disregard for African languages in the world literature is deliberate attempts by imperial powers to wipe out the identity of African people.

More so amidst globalization, the suppression of African languages and domination of European languages in literature portends a great danger to the survival of African languages and African literature. Every African language is a repository of history, culture and values as such, their survival is very significant to



African identity (Ngugi 97). Thus, African languages must be recognized as one of the most powerful social agents for installing indigenous knowledge and we must see the dominance of European languages in African literature as one of the most effective ways for excluding the rights and knowledge of indigenous communities. Notwithstanding, few writers in Africa, such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Mazisi Kunene, Stanley Kagika, Abubakar Imam, Henry Muoria, Abdullatif Abdullah and Daniel Fagunwa, among others, are attempting to reverse this trend in African literature. Yet, there is a scarcity of critical works that explore these indigenous languages' African literature. The bulk of analyses are on the European languages. Some scholars believe that "the most common reason proffered for the omission, elision to be exact, of these indigenous literatures is that their marked linguistic difference renders them inaccessible for scrutiny by the perverted colonialist gaze of Western scholars unless they are presented conveniently for perusal by the masters in the proliferating but usually 'unreadable' translations" (106).

In order to fill this gap therefore, this paper analyzes Ibrahim Shema's award-winning novel, *Yartsana*. The study aims to make a semiotic analysis of the text to prove that certain terms/complexities are better left in their original language because employing post proverbial or foreign languages to translate such terms alters or distorts their meaning. The goal is to appreciate the contribution of Afrophone authors and texts in all of their epistemological, philosophical, and cultural African literary criticism.

### Literature Review

#### African Literature and Indigenous Languages

The attitude of writers and critics towards works of indigenous languages has been a matter of passionate debate among African literary giants such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Chinua Achebe. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o,

for example, decried the use of European languages in African Literature. He argues that language was at the center of imperialism, whereas "the bullet was the means of physical subjugation language was the means of spiritual subjugation" (p. 9). Writing literature in African languages, therefore, is to ensure that literature is connected to a people's revolutionary struggle against colonialism. There were African literary writers who opted for the middle ground to blend African and European style in writing literature. This middle ground is what Homi Bhabha refers to as hybridity. Achebe leads this group. According to Chinua Achebe:

The real question is not whether Africans could write in English but whether they ought to. Is it right that a man should abandon his mother tongue for someone else's? It looks like a dreadful betrayal and produces a guilty feeling. But for me, there is no other choice. I have been given this language and I intend to use it. I hope, though, that there always will be men, like the late Chief Fagunwa, who will choose to write in their native tongue and ensure that our ethnic literature will flourish side by side with the national ones. For those of us who opt for English, there is much work ahead and much excitement (434).

Although the former colonial nations still appropriate the language of their colonizers to communicate and make sense of their world, as is being alluded to by Achebe, the continuous use of foreign languages reinforces a colonial mentality, and this might defeat the project of decolonization. Whatever the side of debate one belongs, one can recognize that the question of language is one of the difficult topics with which African writers still grapple. For example, even Ngũgĩ himself wrote most of his scholarship in English (not in his native Kikuyu). They translated even those he wrote in Kikuyu into English. As Linda Smith notes that indigenous language is a great irony because the matter can only be

seriously “debated in the language of the colonizers” (37). In Nigeria, the current language attitudes can be because of “colonial language policies which Nigeria could not change considerably” (Dajang and Dung 109).

### **Hausa Language and Literature**

The three European languages used in African continents are French, English and, to a much lesser extent, Portuguese. Hausa language, however, is one language that has developed beyond its context of origin (Adamu 1). Also, written literature in Hausa language is more advanced compared to the south. This is because it has been around for centuries before colonization. The interaction between Arab scholars and indigenous traders led to the creation of an easy means of communication known as the ‘Ajami’. It is basically a fusion of Arabic alphabet and the Hausa language to form a hybrid. Writers like Abdullahi Suka, Wali Danmasani and, most importantly, Usman Dan Fodio used the Ajami and Hausa to write in the pre-colonial era. Their works were basically on theology and government. However, introducing the Roman scripture by the missionaries in early 20th century suppressed the use of Ajami in writing. Writers experimented with writing in Hausa using the Roman alphabet. Writers like Abubakar Imam, who is often regarded as one of the pioneering figures of modern Hausa literature, published his novels *Ruwan Bagaja* and *Magana Jari Ce* in 1934 and 1937, which serves as a bridge between the precolonial and contemporary writing in the region. Other prominent indigenous novels include *Shehu Umar* by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, *Gandoki* by Bello Kagara, and *Idon Matambayi* by Muhammad Gwarzo. They were all product of a writing competition in the 1930s aimed at promoting literature in northern Nigeria.

Post-colonial era witnessed a migration from writing in indigenous languages to English. In 1978, *Climate of Corruption* by Yabo Yari became the first novel to be published in English in northern Nigeria.

Other prominent and emerging writers, like Abubakar Gimba, Zainab Alkali, Muhammad Sule, Helon Habila, Razinat Muhammad, E.E. Sule, Abubakar Ibrahim Adam, Elnathan John, among others, use English language to communicate to their readers on matters affecting the region and the society at large. Only a fraction of writers use Hausa in writing novels and most of them are women whose works they mostly regard as popular literature or ‘soyayya books’ because they are full of fantasy and generally not literary. The ones who write literary works are mostly bilingual, writing both in Hausa and English. Such writers include Isma’il Bala and Ibrahim Shema.

Although Hausa language literature is pushed to the margin, the aforementioned contemporary Hausa writers have shown their dexterity by believing that the indigenous languages are the most effective means of communication between a writer and their audience. Similarly, as custodians of their cultural heritage, these writers choose to write in indigenous languages because borrowing foreign languages to express their experiences kill their languages and oppress their collective memory and as Ngugi says, ‘to starve and kill a language is to starve and kill a memory bank,’ (20). The interesting thing about indigenous language is even though English dominates the official cycle, it is the indigenous language media that often reach the largest audiences in broadcast space (Salawu 2016). For example, a 2010 qualitative research report on the BBC Hausa Service says that BBC Hausa has a weekly reach of 23.5 million adults, around four times the size of the audience for the English service in Nigeria. With this number, the indigenous language medium has a wider audience, in terms of expected consumers, than the English language media and writers should be encouraged to explore the language for literary works.

### About the Author/Novel

Ibrahim SHEME is a journalist, film-maker and a publisher. He is a bilingual writer, writing in both English and Hausa. Some of his books include: *The Mallam's Portion* and *Ilimi Mabudin Tafiya*. His award-winning novel, *Yartsana*, is a novel set in Northern Nigeria. It addresses the themes of prostitution, force marriage, and sexually transmitted diseases. The story revolves around Zainab/ Asabe who is the major character. Zainab finds solace in prostitution as a defiance or protest against forced marriage to fill the emotional vacuum created by her father's refusal to marry her off to Tijjani, her lover. As a prostitute, Zainab encounters betrayal, loneliness, humiliation, and finally is infected with HIV/AIDS, which leads to regret and death.

### Theoretical Framework

Ngugi has been at the forefront in advocating for writers in Africa to write in their indigenous languages. In his book *Decolonizing the Mind*, Ngugi questioned the use of foreign languages to write literature for Africans. He argues that language is an important carrier of our culture, hence the continuous use of foreign colonial languages reinforces colonial mentality, and this might defeat the project of decolonization. It should be clear that language as a communication system is not only a carrier of culture but a carrier of memory, or what Frantz Fanon calls "bearing the weight of a civilization" (27). Ngugi's tied language and culture to the material work of both colonization and decolonization. It also examined the close relationship between language and culture. For him "language carries, and culture carries, particularly through orature and literature, the entire body of values by which we come to perceive ourselves and our place in our world." (34), *Decolonizing the Mind* is a useful conceptual tool through which to understand how power imbalances are practiced as culturally encoded automated reflexes through the normalization of European

languages. Thus, the linguistic cycle of identification and interpretation can get distorted by the force of colonialism. In other words, European languages have become the default vehicles for African literature. Thus, in any attempt to discuss the politics and hierarchy of language in the psychological warfare to wean the colonized from the domination of imperialism etched into the lifeworld of modern African societies, one must make recourse to the Ngugi's *Decolonizing the Mind*.

### Data

The main data for this paper is Ibrahim SHEME's *Yartsana*. The analysis focuses on the different cultural vocabularies used in the novel and the complexities that might be involved in translating them to English.

### Analysis

The analysis focuses on certain terms used in the novel which capture the cultural context of the people the novel is set. The concepts also shed more light on the theme and setting of the text. However, these terms carry significant cultural ethos of the Hausa people, such that attempts to translate them would render the terms something different from their original meaning. Among these terms include cultural concepts, social moral concepts, and proverbs.

#### 1. Cultural Concepts

The novel is laden with terms that are exclusive to Hausa language. Such terms include the following:

*Auren Dole*: this is roughly translated as 'forced marriage' in English. The translation slightly lessens the weight of such a powerful term which, in a Hausa setting, is believed to have an adverse effect on the victim, especially women and the society at large. In Zainab's/Asabe's case, it forces her to become a prostitute who dies of AIDS after infecting Tahir, her lover.

*Auren Zumunci*: translating this term into English is impossible to begin with. This is because it is a practice that is predominantly common among the Hausa-Fulani cultures.

It is a type of marriage that involves the union of two people who are related (cousins, in most cases). Mallam Tukur's reason for denying Tijjani Zainab, despite his good character, is simply because he is not related to her. Abubakar marries her on the other hand because they are related. Auren zumunci turns out to be a good union when there is love between the two parties. However, when the couple doesn't love each other, it becomes an 'auren dole' as in the case of Zainab/Asabe.

*Kudin Toshi*: Similarly, this can only be roughly explained in English as the money/gift a man gives his lover or her family, indicating his intention to marry her. The money symbolizes shutting doors to any suitor who could pose a threat to his chances of marrying the lover. However, in the novel, kudin toshi doesn't represent a seal to potential proposals from other suitors, but as a form of bribe given to a pimp so as to entice and divert the attention of a prostitute from satisfying other men especially when she is a 'fresher'. Lado in the novel is willing to pay any amount to Abu Maijigida as his 'kudin toshi' for Zainab when Abu Maijigida initiates her into prostitution.

*Farar Kafa*: when a person is said to have a 'farar kafa', especially a woman, it means that such person is a harbinger of calamity. Any man that marries such a woman may encounter setbacks/challenges in his life. A direct translation of this is 'white leg' which absolutely doesn't make sense. Explaining such a term in foreign language is impossible because like the term 'auren zumunci', this is also attached to the culture of the Hausa-Fulani in Northern Nigeria and thus can only be fully comprehended when left in its original language (Hausa).

## 2. Social/Moral Concepts

As a novel that depicts the lives of prostitutes in a conservative setting, certain terms that are associated with immorality or considered taboos are used in the language of the novel. These include:

*Shu'uma*: this is a derogatory and highly offensive term used to describe a wayward woman. Using words like shameless or wayward to describe Bebe-sai-Tumoro for instance in the text, limits the powerful description/characterization the author intends the reader to imagine when confronted with a character like Bebe-sai-Tumoro. Yar -caburos is a slang also used to describe such women.

*Zaman Dadiro*: while in other societies, a man and woman can live in the same house before marriage, such an act is a taboo in conservative Northern Nigeria. 'Zaman dadiro' is only meant for prostitutes and highly immoral men.

*Sabon Jini*: this is often used to describe youth. However, in the text, 'sabon jini' refers to newly initiated prostitutes who are young and generally lack the experience of prostitution.

*Sheka Aya*: explaining this term in any foreign language will be challenging because no word seems to capture the perfect meaning of this term. The closest explanation for this is, enjoying or doing as one pleases without fearing the consequences. In the novel, Zainab is advised to completely change her identity to prevent her family from knowing her whereabouts and most importantly, she must detach her mind completely from home if she truly wants to enjoy her life as a prostitute.

*Yan Bana Bakwai*: it has the same connotation as 'sabon jini'

*Abin Terere*: this refers to a shameful and controversial act that a person does that causes people to mock, disdain or insult him and his family. Mallam Tukur disowned Zainab when she gives birth to Dan'asabe out of wedlock (which is a taboo) because the act makes people trample upon his dignity and hers as well. This 'abin terere' is finally what triggered Zainab to leave Naggetu without turning back.

*Ci-ni-in-ci-tuwo*: this term is extremely vulgar and offensive. It can be explained as a desperate, hungry and cheap prostitute who sleeps with men just to put food on the table. Translating this term as simply a desperate prostitute has completely erased the vulgarity of the term. A serious fight erupts when Asabe accuses Iyani Yarkwatano of being a ‘ci-ni-in-ci-tuwo’ prostitute (p 173). Even the author explains that it is the most derogatory name to call a prostitute. Such vulgar terms need to be reflected in the vocabulary of a book that explores prostitution, therefore, translating them using foreign languages only weakens their intensity and effectiveness in capturing the lives of prostitutes.

*Bitu da Kulli*: this is also another term that has no direct translation but only roughly explained. It can mean treason, betrayal or hypocrisy. An individual who helps a friend openly but secretly wishing to see his downfall, that he renders, is said to have a ‘bitu da kulli’. In the novel, politicians like Nakande Tade-su and Alhaji Audu Dara are accused of ‘bitu da kulli’ to their country because they engage in crimes like corruption, drug trafficking, pipeline vandalisation, armed robbery, among others. It means they are unpatriotic citizens who are nonchalant towards the progress of their country.

### 3. Proverbs

Apart from using certain terms to capture the cultural context of the setting and theme of *Yartsana*, proverbial sayings which are common among indigenous languages in Africa are also employed by the author to further embellish his literary voice and also explain more about the setting. Like the above terms, translating indigenous proverbs into foreign language only leads to the mutilation of their meaning thus, leading to a breakdown in communication. Such proverbs used in the text include:

*Ana rabewa da addini don a harbi karsana* (p 24)

‘Hiding under religion to get what one wants’

The proverb explains religious hypocrisy. An instant is depicted in the novel when government wages war against prostitution, but ironically, most government officials love the prostitutes.

*Duk inda ta fadi, sha ne* (p 26)

When Zainab runs away from Naggetu, she has no destination. Anywhere that fate takes her, she has no option. Thus, she makes the above statement. Translating it in English won’t make sense and that means the meaning will be lost.

*Komai ta tsunduma tsundum* (p 28)

‘Whatever befalls her, so be it’

Translating it not only is inadequate, but completely changes the original proverb to an ordinary statement.

*Tsalle daya shi ke tura mutum rijiya* (p 63)

‘It is one leap that puts a person into a well’

This translation drains the proverb of its purpose: to warn people to shun vices/mistakes so as to avoid regrets.

*Matar mutum kabarinsa* (232)

‘A man’s wife is like his grave’

For the sentence to even be correct in English, the proverb has to be converted into a simile, which alters the meaning entirely. It can roughly be explained to connote that it is only fate that determines who a person marries and not loves or wealth. This instance is depicted in the text when fate decides Tijjani will never marry Zainab despite the love between them.

*Kida ya sauya, rawa ma ta canza* (p 238)

‘When the beat changes, the dance step changes too’

Though this translation is a little comprehensive, it lacks the intensity of the original meaning.

From the above analysis, it can be argued that indeed complexities in indigenous languages cannot be effectively captured using foreign languages such as English, as depicted in SHEME’s novel. In a situation where an alien language is used to describe or translate them, for instance in Aliyu Kamal’s *Fire in My Backyard*, they inexorably pass through ‘a process of modification, distortion, accretion, commission and omission,’ (Abdul 14), thus, losing their meaning, significance and authenticity. Achebe’s advocacy for domesticating foreign languages such as English in order to reflect and ‘globalize’ the African experience/reality can easily be disputed in this context.

### Conclusion

The paper argues that the use of African indigenous languages such as Hausa as a means of communication, are generally not regarded, recognized and encouraged in both the academia and literary world despite their ability of giving an authentic portrayal of the cultural context in which they are produced. From the analysis of SHEME’s *Yartsana*, the paper proves that certain terms/complexities are better left in their original language because employing post proverbial or foreign languages to translate such terms alters or distorts their meaning. This calls for the need for literary criticism in African languages. And equally important, we have to decolonize African literary theory. Why should literary criticism continue to draw its primary conceptual oxygen from European literary theories? Why not use African literary theory to unlock the aesthetics of African literature? After all, our imaginations draw from our creolized cultures, and our cultures have and have had their own approaches to aesthetics, hence, the need to

to encourage (for being the real custodians of Africa’s cultural heritage) indigenous writers. Literary analytical tools can be found in the cultures that produce African literature, but only if we first dig deep into African languages.

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